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McNally Revisited:

The "Misrepresentation Branch"of the Mail Fraud
Statute a Decade Later·
"To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute
is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our
Cuisinart--and our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with
/Ob-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling', but we always come home
to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability and
comfortable familiarity. It understands us and, like many a foolish
spouse, we like to think we understand it." 1
I. INTRODUCTION

If conspiracy is indeed the darling of the prosecutor's nursery, 2 then
mail fraud must surely be its younger sibling. The mail fraud statute has
been used extensively to prosecute a multitude of criminal activities. 3 Often, the applicability of the mail fraud statute is dependant only upon the
prosecutor's creativity. 4 When coupled with the nearly Draconian penalties of RIC0, 5 the mail fraud statute becomes a formidable weapon in the
prosecutor's arsenal. However, due to consistently mistaken statutory
construction and fundamental shifts in the Supreme Court's stance toward the breadth of the mail fraud statute, confusion abounds about
which activities are punishable for mail fraud, and specifically, what elements constitute the offense of mail fraud. Nowhere is this uncertainty
more evident than in questions concerning the meaning of the statute's
misrepresentation clause.

*
I.

Copyright© 1998 by Christopher Q. Cutler.
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1}, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771

(1980).
2. Judge Learned Hand first memorialized this mantra of prosecutors in Harrison v. United
States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) ("conspiracy, that darling of the modem prosecutor's
nursery").
3. At one point, courts described the extent of the mail fraud statute, and its twin, the wire
fraud statute, as "seemingly limitless." United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981) (noting also that "[t]he absence of legislative guidance
has left the courts with broad discretion to apply the mail fraud statute to the myriad of fraudulent
schemes devised by unscrupulous entrepreneurs"). !d. at I 005.
4. Mail fraud has been referred to as a "first line of defense" to new forms of fraud that
are otherwise not conveniently prosecutable. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5. Under RICO, mail fraud may be punished by up to twenty years imprisonment and
significant forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Civil remedies are also available under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964. One study suggests that 57% of all civil RICO claims are predicated on mail or wire
fraud. Brad D. Brian, Predicate Acts of Mail and Wire Fraud, 141 PLI/Crim 79 (1986).
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Mail fraud, as history shows, has evolved significantly over time.
Prior to 1909, the mail fraud statute was only implemented to prosecute
"a scheme or artifice to defraud." 6 However, the statutory language was
later amended to include the misrepresentation clause, which prohibits
"obtaining property or money through fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 7 The interplay between these two clauses has become
a compelling area of jurisprudence and an influential guide to federal
prosecutors.
Interpretation of the misrepresentation clause has evolved through
three separate stages: (1) the Pre-Durland period of statutory purity; (2)
the Durland mandated period of clearly separated clauses; and (3) PostMcNally confusion. Throughout these transitions, application of the statutory prohibition against "obtaining property or money through fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises" has undergone a distinct maturation.8
This article analyzes the misrepresentation clause, principally by
comparing judicial decisions and examining statutory construction. Part II
focuses on the evolution of the mail fraud statute, from its historical impetus in the mid-1800s to the seminal McNally case in 1987. Important
developments from both the courtroom and the halls of Congress are analyzed circumspectly. Part III studies the McNally decision and its immediate impact on interpretation of the misrepresentation clause, including
Congressional reaction. Against this background, Part IV examines postMcNally prosecutions in their attempt to define the connection between
the scheme-to-defraud and misrepresentation clauses. Finally, Part V is
designed to serve as a pragmatic guide to future mail fraud jurisprudence,
arguing that the two mail fraud clauses ought to be treated as independent
prosecutorial alternatives.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE
A.

Original Statutory Construction and Judicial Response

The mail fraud statute has a long and colorful history in American
jurisprudence. First instituted in 1872 as a portion of the recodified postal
laws, the mail fraud statute has primarily served as a means of preventing
the imposition of fraud on the postal system. Originally, the mail fraud
statute proscribed anyone from "devis[ing] or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening or intend-

6. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323; Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393,
§ 5480, 25 Stat. 873.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
8. !d.
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ing to open correspondence or communication with any other person ...
by means of the post-office establishment" and punished as a misdemeanor any such act. 9 The purpose of this statute, as enunciated by the
sponsor of the broad postal revisions, was "to prevent the frauds which
are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people in the country." 10 When the validity of the recodified postal laws
was first challenged in 1878, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes, finding that Congress' power to "establish post offices and post roads"" included the right to regulate all functions of the
postal industry. 12 The Court concluded that the "right to designate what
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be
excluded." 13
Mail fraud, as created, was not a mere codification of the common
Jaw. While the common law initially resisted creation of a criminal offense of fraud, 14 courts later permitted it. 15 As originally constituted, the
mail fraud statute did not contain language reflecting common law fraudulent offenses such as that of common law cheat or deceit. 16 And even
though mail fraud was not entirely the product of statutory construction,
due to the unique addition of the requirement of the use of the mails, it
was nearly interpreted as such. Understandably, a degree of confusion
arose within the legal community as to how to treat this creature of the
law.
Subsequent case law more clearly delineated the power to regulate
fraud through the mail. In United States v. Loring, 17 a federal district
court elaborated on the species of fraud sufficient to support a conviction
of mail fraud. The court noted that "the scheme or artifice to defraud ...
should be so fully stated as to enable the court to see, as a matter of law,
that, if consummated, a fraud would be perpetrated." 18 However, the
court felt that "it need not ... be a fraud either at common law or by stat-

9. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (emphasis added).
10. McNally v. United States 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting Remarks of Representative
John Franklin Farnsworth of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Scss. 35 (1870)).
II. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
12. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877).
13. !d. This reasoning upheld the constitutionality of the mail fraud statute as an integral
portion of the recodified postal laws. See United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 882 (D Ill. 1884).
14. For example, in Ref?ina v. Jones it was stated that "we are not to indict one for making
a fool of another." 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (1703).
15. For a comparison between mail fraud and common law offenses see Courtney Chetty
Genco, What Happened to Durland?: Mail Fraud, Rico, and Justifiable Reliance. 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 333, 337-57 (1992).
16. See generally id.
17. 91 F. 881 (D. Ill. 1884)
18. !d. at 884-85.
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ute. It was enough if it was a scheme or purpose to defraud any persons of
their money." 19 This language reflected the popular sentiment of the
time-an emphasis on the "scheme to defraud," not an exact devotion to
the common law. 20 Thus mail fraud became largely a creature of statute,
warily enabled only to prevent those frauds perpetrated pursuant to a
scheme. 21
Loring represented an adherence to the statutory language and a careful view of the statute. Courts were reluctant to expand the extent of the
statute during this period. 22 While some argument can be made that several courts took a much more expansive view of the statute, 23 as a general
rule courts confined themselves to the limits of the statutory language in
defining which activities could be prosecuted as mail fraud. 24 In 1896,
however, the Supreme Court in Durland v. United States 25 broadened the
legal analysis of the statute and effectively gave birth to what would soon
become another favorite in the prosecutor's nursery.

19. !d. at 887.
20. See. e.g., United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (recognizing a
difference between mail fraud and "state statutes or a common law" and interpreting the statute
by its plain language).
21. See generally Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895). Stokes deliniated
the three distinct elements of mail fraud under the particular version of the statute then in effect:
(I) that the persons charged must have devised a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) that
they must have intended this scheme by opening or intending to open correspondence
with some other person through the post office establishment, or by inciting such other
person to open communication with them; (3) and that, in carrying out such scheme,
such person must have either deposited a letter or packet in the post office, or taken
or receive one therefrom.
/d. This statute-based framework reflected the contours of mail fraud prosecution at that time,
circumspectly allowing those crimes to be prosecuted that clearly fell within the statutory range.
See id.
22. See. e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that
early cases attempted to "severely limit the term scheme to defraud").
23. For example, some commentators feel that two competing schools of thought existed,
a "broad constructionist" and "strict constructionist" school. See Genco, supra note 15. While this
characterization may be correct in some contexts (as in the debate among the courts during that
time as to the necessity of a mailing), I remain unconvinced that it is more valid than the one
presented in this paper when applied to the substantive crimes that were prosecuted at that time.
24. See generally United States v. Long, 68 F. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1895) (rejecting an
indictment that did not accurately mirror the statutory scheme); United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160,
161 (D. Colo. 1895) (recognizing that "the statute is not limited to the particular deceits mentioned
in it," but limited to those generally regarded as a scheme or artifice to defraud); United States v.
Smith, 45 F. 561, 563 (E. D. Wis. 1891) (noting that while the language of the statute may not
accurately represent the intent of Congress, "ita lex scripta est, and it must be administered as
declared"); United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492, 493 (W.O. Penn. 1888) (finding that "[w]hatever
is not plainly within its provision shall be regarded as without its intendment").
25. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
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Creation of the Misrepresentation Clause

Durland v. United States: Genesis of the misrepresentation clause

In 1889, Congress amended the mail fraud statute for the first time,
an action that both enlarged the scope of the statute and specified behavior prohibited by the enactment. Congress declared that mail fraud could
be committed by
any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or
distribute, supply, or furnish, or procure of unlawful use ... or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or through
correspondence. 26
A few years later, Durland v. United States gave the Supreme Court its
first opportunity to clarify exactly what behavior constituted mail fraud
under the amended statute. 27
In Durland, the defendant argued that the mail fraud statute should
only prohibit activities actionable under common-law fraud cases that
"would come within the definition of 'false pretenses,' in order to make
out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact." 28
The Supreme Court disagreed with this characterization of the statute.
Prophetically recognizing the future of mail fraud prosecution, the Court
held that "[t]he statute is broader than is claimed. Its letter shows this:
'Any scheme or artifice to defraud.' Some schemes may be promoted
through mere representations and promises as to the future, yet are none
the less schemes and artifices to defraud." 29 The Supreme Court, for the
first time, acknowledged the breadth of the statute, with resulting boundaries not confined by previous statutory interpretation. Any other reading
of the statute, under the Court's reasoning, would prevent the government
from protecting the public against the various frauds propagated through
the mail. The following explanatory language proved to be the guiding
ensign of mail fraud jurisprudence for some time to come:

26. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (emphasis added). This section
specifically prohibits dealing in "sawdust swindle," "counterfeit money fraud," "green articles,"
"green coin," "bills," "paper goods," "Spurious Treasury notes," "United States goods," "green
cigars," and other misbegotten articles. ld. Subsequent revisions abrogated such specific language,
replacing it with the current "counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or other article, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article." 18
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1997).
27. 161 U.S. at 306.
28. ld. at 312.
29. fd. at 313.
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It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used
to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip
it of value to confine it to such cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the
allurement of a specious and glittering promise?11

Understandably, federal prosecutors reveled in the unprecedented
breadth Durland promised; this sentiment echoed throughout the prosecutions of the next century. Mail fraud became more than just a traditional
fraud; it evolved into a spectrum of fraudulent activity, with only the prosecutor's creative characterization of the statutory language delimitating
the boundaries of the offense. 31 For the first time the courts recognized an
element of misrepresentation 32 to be present in mail fraud, though this
element was not a dispositive factor. Curiously, mail fraud became a statutory creature that not only devoured its legislative mandate in whole, it
became a precocious duel entity -- the new sweetheart of the prosecutor's
nursery, yet a ravenous and sanguine monster, roaming freely through the
legal landscape.
In 1909, Congress added to the mail fraud statute a prohibition that
included future misrepresentations, thereby codifying the holding in
Durland. 33 Indeed, the legislature specifically emphasized the Durland
decision by adding the phrase "or obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises." 34 In 1948,
Congress fine-tuned the mail fraud statute, eliminating superfluities. That

30. !d. at 314.
31. See generally Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1902), cert.
denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902) (recognizing that the intent and purpose of those committing mail
fraud outweighed statutory reliance on a technical definition of a scheme or artifice to defraud).
32. Recapitulating what the federal courts have said, misrepresentation has been defined as:
a statement or an assertion which concerns a material or important aspect of the matter
in question and that was known to be untrue at the time it was made or used, or that
was made or used with reckless indifference as to whether it was, in fact, true or false,
and made or used with the intent to defraud .... The term ... includes actual, direct
false statements as well as half-truths, and includes the knowing concealment of facts
that are material or important to the matter in question and that were made or used with
the intent to defraud.
2 EDWARD J. DEvm ET AL., FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, §40.13, at 521 (4th ed.
1990). For a substantive discussion of the differences between these two clauses in modern
jurisprudence see United States v. Goldburg, 913 F. Supp. 629, 637-38 (D. Mass 1996).
33. Congress, however, did not extend the mail fraud statute to the full breadth the Court
had implied it should be in Durland. Apparently, the revision was more narrow than the
"everything designed to defraud" language found in the Court's decision. See McNally v. Unites
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987). See also Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873.
34. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873.
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version, in many respects, resembles the statute in effect today. 35 The
omission of specific crimes such as dealing in "green articles" and "green
cigars" was induced by the Supreme Court's willingness to look beyond
the statutory language in an attempt to find the "evil sought to be remedied."36

2.

Legal ramifications of Durland

From the revision of 1948 until 1987, the mail fraud statute changed
little in form, 37 but prosecution under the statute evolved to meet changing prosecutorial concems. 38 The Supreme Court in Durland had created
an important new precedent, and Congress had codified it, apparently
solidifying the expansive scope of the statute. In reality, the addition of a
misrepresentation prohibition became the conduit for judicially broadening the mail fraud statute to govern crimes unanticipated prior to
Durland. The Supreme Court had opened a Pandora's box with the addition of the misrepresentation proscription, freeing the judicial reins and
allowing courts to broadly interpret the statute. Consequently, courts became quite liberal, allowing prosecutors to employ the statute in a variety

35.

Act of June 25. 1948 ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763. The statute states:

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises to
sell, dispose or, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful purposes any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article,
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at
the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
!d. The an1endment notably also dismissed any requirement that the fraud "be effectuated by
either opening or intending correspondence or communication ... [through] the post office." !d.
36. Durland, 161 U.S. at 313.
37. The statute was amended in 1949, yet this was only to correct a typographical error.
Also. during this interim. the statute was recodified under its present number. See Historical and
Statutory Notes to 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1997).
38. "The general language in the mail fraud statute has repeatedly been construed to cover
novel species of fraud .... [it] 'has been characterized as the first line of defense against virtually
every new area of fraud to develop in the United States in the past century'" McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 374 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakoff, supra note 1. at 77273)
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of contexts. 39 Not surprisingly, the statute soon became the first line of
defense against new forms of fraud. 40
Yet, as the statute encompassed more and more area, it also became
more and more defined. Courts began to differentiate between the original scheme-to-defraud clause and the recently-added misrepresentation
clause. 41
Interpreting the misrepresentation and scheme-to-defraud
clauses to constitute completely separate offenses, several courts held
that a conviction would be upheld if based on either clause. 42 Specifically, courts found
several alternatives in which the mail fraud offense may be
committed, ... [including] (I) a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (2)
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises. The activities proscribed by either of these
clauses constitute independent grounds for conviction of mail fraud. 43
Thus, "the defendant's activities [could] be a scheme or artifice to
defraud whether or not specific misrepresentations [were] involved." 44 In

39. Recognizing that the statute was used to prosecute "novel and marginal forms of
misconduct that have traditionally been viewed as involving only civil, ethical, or regulatory
violations," it has been noted that the mail fraud statute has been employed in the prosecutions
of "an attorney violating ethical rules .. a politician favoring the interests of his political
cronies ... a union official arranging a 'sweetheart' labor contract ... [and] a sexually frustrated
man seeking to seduce women by promising to place them in modeling and acting roles." OTIO
G. 0BERMAJER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses
§ 9.01, at 9-4 (1998).
40. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that "when a 'new' fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized
legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil").
41. See, e.g., United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 921 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
the clauses should be read independently); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp.
1492, 1507 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that "the statute discussed two separate types of maiVwire fraud
offenses: one may act pursuant to a 'scheme of artifice to defraud' or one may act 'by means of
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises'" and joining other courts that give the
statute "such a disjunctive meaning"); Lemon v. United States, 278 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1960)
(noting that a conviction under the first prong of the statute does not require a misrepresentation).
42. Specifically, Frankel said that "[a]lthough the added clause was intended to identify
and proscribe a particular course of conduct, it does not follow that the first and more general
clause was restricted by the amendment." 721 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1983). See also United States
v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (lith Cir.) (clarifying the components of the statute), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting
that mail fraud requires no misrepresentation if there is a scheme to defraud); United States v.
Classic, 35 F. Supp 457, 458 (E.D. La. 1940) (recognizing as separate the scheme or artifice to
defraud and misrepresentation).
43. United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. I 98 I) This court felt that
ignoring the separate nature of both prongs "flies in the face of the language of 18 U.S. C. § 1341 ,
which specified several alternative ways in which the mail fraud offense may be committed." /d.
44. !d. See also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the
clauses to be independent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d
579, 585 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring no showing that statements be false, fraudulent on their face,
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1987, however, the Supreme Court handed down McNally v. United
States, 45 a case that strongly questioned the structural independence of the
two clauses in the mail fraud statue.
Ill.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: MCNALLY AND AN IDENTITY CRISIS FOR
THIS DARLING OF THE NURSERY

As the reach of the mail fraud statute extended into previously unforeseen realms, a specific and novel application of the statute developed
that would set the stage for McNally v. United States, the first major
reigning in of the roaming monster. Beginning with dicta in 1947,46 an
"intangible rights theory" developed and soon enveloped all of the federal
circuits. 47 The intangible rights doctrine held that under the scheme-todefraud element of mail fraud, the fraud need not only affect tangible
property rights, it may affect the "intangible right to the 'honest services'
of public officials."48 This doctrine was predicated on the plain reading of
the statute: the "scheme or artifice to defraud" language was independent,
and separated by the disjunctive "or," from the "obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses" language. 49 As the
two clauses of the statute were read independently, it was determined that
the scheme to defraud need not involve the acquisition of money or property. The fraudulent gains could be intangible. 50
Howard W. Hunt, an active Democrat in the state of Kentucky, was
made the chairman of the state Democratic Party after the gubernatorial
election of 1974. Consequently, Hunt was entrusted with the responsibility of selecting the insurance policies for state workers. Hunt contacted a
certain insurance company that was eventually granted the contract for

or mvolve a misrepresentation-all that is required is a scheme calculated to defraud others), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th 1973) (same), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1932) (requiring
no misrepresentation for a scheme to defraud), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565 (1932).
45. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
46. "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an
advantage by corrupting such an one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud."
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
47. While the intangible rights doctrine may seem merely ancillary to the analysis of the
misrepresentation clause, the Supreme Court's treatment of this doctrine set the stage for McNally's
major reversal in the application of the mail fraud statute, specifically relating to the relationship
between the separate clauses of the statute.
48. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 187-88 (1993).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
50. See generally United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that
"[ f]radulent schemes designed to cause losses of an intangible nature clearly come within the terms
of this statute"); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980); United States v. Rauhaff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding a conviction for
defrauding the right of the public to Joyal and faithful service by state officials).
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the workers' compensation policy, but included a stipulation that the
company share any commissions in excess of $50,000 per year with other
specified insurance companies. A company owned by Hunt with several
other partners was one of those that received payments. Prosecutors
charged Hunt and the other owners of the company with one count of
conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud. The prosecution based its case
on the fact that the defendants had "devised a scheme ... to defraud the
citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly." 51 The trial court convicted the defendants on the conspiracy and mail fraud charges. 52
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding
support in the "line of decisions from the Courts of Appeals holding that
the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government." 53 The Supreme
Court, however, reversed these convictions, delivering what it perceived
to be the death knell to widespread use of the intangible rights doctrine,
by limiting the doctrine to cases where an economic loss accompanies the
loss of honest governmental services. The mail fraud statute, it reasoned,
protects property rights "but does not refer to the intangible right of the
citizenry to good government." 54
Justice White, writing for the majority, found that while Durland had
recognized broad applicability of the statute, this applicability extended
only to property rights. Durland had spoken as to "everything designed to
defraud by representations," but Congress had nevertheless subsequently
reciprocated with "[any scheme or artifice] for obtaining money or property."55 In essence, while broadening the scope of the statute, Congress
had created a more limited standard than intimated under Durland. Thus,
fraudulent representation became conditioned upon the defrauding of real
property. While the majority recognized that the separate clauses of
scheme to defraud and misrepresentation appear in the disjunctive in the
statute, and thus arguably could be construed independently, it found language in earlier cases equating fraud with tangible fraud to be more per-

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 353 (1987).
See id.
/d. at 355.
/d. at 356.
/d. at 357.

77]

MCNALLY AND MAIL FRAUD A DECADE LATER

87

suasive. 56 The majority held that the first prong of the mail fraud statute
is tempered and effectually conditioned by the second prong.
The majority's analysis of the two elements of the mail fraud statute
is compelling because the majority interposes a confusing constructive
juxtaposition. The statutory clauses are mutually exclusive, yet interdependent. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, persuasively critiqued this obfuscated analysis.
Justice Stevens recognized three different prohibitions advanced by
the mail fraud statute: ( 1) scheme to defraud, (2) false pretenses (misrepresentation), and (3) counterfeiting. 57 To demonstrate the independence
of each clause, he noted that a violation of one element does not necessarily constitute a violation of any of the others. Yet in its opinion, the majority had sought to apply the first clause in a context defined by the second. Stevens accused the majority of "show[ing] no fidelity to Congress'
words or purpose" by intermingling the separate clauses. 58 He noted that,
in essence, the majority had construed the "false pretenses" phrase as
only "modifying the original prohibition." 59 Justice Stevens compared the
statutory language to the judicial definitions of fraud the majority had
presented, and astutely recognized that the case relied upon by the majority had held that to prove a conspiracy to defraud "[i]t is not necessary
that the Government shall be subjected to property loss by the fraud, but
only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by
misrepresentation, chicane, or the overreaching of those charged with
carrying out the governmental intention." 6° Clearly, Justice Stevens felt
that the majority had significantly muddied the waters as to the activities
that constitute mail fraud. Also, the majority had proved itself an infidel
to the common weight of authority among the federal circuits. 61 He ominously concluded his dissent by predicting that "[i]n the long run, it is not
clear how grave the ramifications of today' s decision may be." 62

56. See id. at 358. The Court specifically cited language from Hammerschmidt v. United
States, that interpreted "to defraud" to mean "wronging one in his property rights by dishonest
methods or schemes." 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924). Hammerschmidt was a case involving conspiracy
to resist regulations requiring registration for selective service and was not prosecuted under the
mail fraud statute. The dissent felt the applicability of Hammerschmidt to be inapposite in the
context of mail fraud. Additionally, the dissent notes that Hammerschmidt "itself goes on to
expressly reject the notion that fraud is limited to interference with monetary or property rights."
McNally, 483 U.S at 369 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 364-65.
58. /d. at 366.
59. /d. at 373.
60. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
61. Justice Stevens felt that McNally went against the prior judicial decisions and violated
the venerable tenet that "it is the common opinion, and communis opinio is of good authority in
law." Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 818 (1998) (Stevens, J,. dissenting).
62. McNally, 483 U.S. at 377. In a subsequent case decided that same term. the Court
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In response to McNally and its progeny, 63 Congress amended the mail
fraud statute to its present form. The present statute was intended to
trump McNally-the Court had challenged Congress to speak more
clearly if it wished to extend the mail fraud statute, 64 so Congress met this
challenge. 65 Consequently, the mail fraud statute now embraces the intangible rights theory through 18 U.C.A. § 1346.66 The amendment broadened the statutory language to reflect pre-McNally law among federal
courts that subscribed to the intangible rights doctrine. 67 Once again, the
sibling sweetheart of the prosecutor's nursery can rein in the activities of
corrupt politicians. 68 However, the lingering effects of McNally continue
to fester in the federal courts. 69
IV. POST-MCNAUY

In the decade since McNally, a multitude of courts have played the
judicial soothsayer, attempting to divine from the cryptic harbingers of
the high Court and the Congress what fate has befallen the mail fraud

found that a property right existed in keeping information at a newspaper confidential until
publication. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (!987) (reasoning that confidential
business information was not comparable to an intangible right to impartial government).
Commentators have felt that these two decisions seem inconsistent. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley.
Mail Fraud Ajier McNally and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
573 (1988).
63. The reasoning of the court in McNally was subsequently mirrored in several lower
federal court cases. See, e.g., United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding
that McNally prohibited mail fraud convictions for deprivation of information concerning breaches
of fiduciary duty); United States v. Baldinger. 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding an indictment
couched solely in terms of the intangible rights doctrine improper after McNally).
64. "If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than this." McNally. 483
U.S. at 360.
65. The refusal to "accept the widely held view of lower courts about the scope of fraud
was quickly corrected by the !DOth Congress." West Va. Univ. Hosp .. Inc. v. Casey, 499 US. 83.
114-15 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
66. To mitigate judicial erosion of mail fraud through McNally, in 1988 Congress created
18 U.S.C. § 1346 which reads: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."
/d. See State v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that Congress incorporated the
intangible rights doctrine into § 1346) .. cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (!989); United States v. Frost.
125 F.3d 346, 364 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that "§ 1346 has restored the mail fraud statute to its
pre-McNally scope, according to its previous opinions interpreting the intangible right to honest
services").
67. The recent amendments also have broadened the statute significantly in other areas. For
example, the statute now protects against fraud that is delivered by mail "or other such carrier."
18 U.S.C. § 1346.
68. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 732-35 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that a
Regional Director of Texas Worker's Compensation Commission could be found violating the
public right to honest services).
69. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1434-40 (acknowledging that § 1346 did
not entirely eviscerate McNally).
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statute. McNally sent shock waves throughout the legal community .70
Many subsequent cases have dealt with specific procedural issues raised
by McNally. 71 Substantively, it appears that McNally has profoundly confused mail fraud jurisprudence. McNally has come to stand for two general propositions: (1) the jurisdiction of the mail fraud statute is not unlimited, and yet (2) the Court may reject the pre-Durland devotion to the
statutory language completely. While the first proposition seems to be the
most egregiously demanding of prosecutorial concern, the second may
prove to be the most problematic. Conceivably, the Court has created a
situation where the first prong of the statute is so conditioned by the second that every mail fraud must involve a misrepresentation. Also, the
Court may have developed a scheme that reverses Durland, obviating the
second prong completely. Only through a careful canvass of recent caselaw do the true ramifications of McNally on the misrepresentation clause
become apparent, and while unsure of many aspects of the relationship
between McNally and § 1346, courts have unfailingly adhered to Justice
Stevens' distinct clause analysis.
United States v. Cooper72 provides a crystalized expose of the strict
adherence to statutory independence. Not long after the Supreme Court
delivered the McNally decision, two defendants were charged with wire
fraud and, on the basis of McNally, requested that the jury be instructed
on both clauses of the statute conjointly rather than in the alternative. 73
Specifically, the defendant requested that the jury be advised that mail
fraud requires "(1) a scheme or plan to defraud of property or money, (2)
to obtain by false pretenses, and (3) the use of the wire in furtherance
thereof." 74 This request, clearly relying on McNally, sought to completely
ignore the disjunctive between the scheme-to-defraud and misrepresentation clauses. The district court rejected this argument, finding that the
statutory interpretation in McNally only required that the former clause
involve the loss of "money or property," 75 not that the latter also involve

70. The McNally decision "has been variously described as 'blockbusting,' as a 'total
surprise,' as a 'wholly unexpected application of the law of mail fraud.'" United States v. Ochs,
842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
71. Many cases, for example, have dealt with the retroactivity of McNally. Some courts have
overturned convictions due to the McNally decision. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d
122 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989); United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232 (9th
Cir. 1989). Other courts, however, have distinguished McNally and allowed convictions to stand.
See, e.g., United States v. Utz, 886 F.2d 1148 (9th 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990);
O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1988); Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208
(lith Cir. 1988).
72. 677 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1988).
73. The wire fraud statute is interpreted "in pari materia" with the mail fraud statute. United
States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981).
74. Cooper, 677 F. Supp. at 780.
75. /d.
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a scheme to defraud. 76 The court found that intermingling the two phrases
in such a manner "would be to rewrite the clear language of the statute
and to undercut the intended purpose of its second phrase. That purpose,
as we have seen, is to prohibit schemes ... that don't fall within the traditional definitions of fraud." 77 The court in this instance intentionally resisted a "further narrowing" of the statute in order to fulfill the intent of
the statute. 78
The Cooper decision has been consistently reflected throughout subsequent judicial decisions. Courts have noted that while the clauses are
"overlapping" at times, they do nevertheless constitute separate elements.79 The main difference between the two clauses is that the scheme
to defraud "focuses on the end result ... [and] the scheme to obtain
money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses . . . focuses on the
means by which the money was obtained." 8° Courts have not intermingled
the two statutory provisions, and have required separate evidence for the
two offenses. 81 Generally, the courts have held that the "elements of mail
fraud remain unchanged" after McNally. 82 Thus, Justice Stevens' intimated fears that the two prongs of the statute would become indistinguishable were misplaced. Courts have not retreated from the preMcNally separate prong analysis, and the ruling of McNally has been confined to have substantially affected only the intangible rights doctrine,
and that of course only temporarily. 83
Further support for the distinction between the two clauses can be
found in the model jury instructions given by the federal courts. The instructions for the federal circuits effectively mirror the case law that has

76. The court specifically stated that the second clause "is self-explanatory and should be
interpreted as written-the obtaining by the misrepresentor, not the loss by the person defrauded,
is the gist of the second phrase." /d.
77. !d.
78. !d.
79. See United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1990) (finding that the two
clauses, while overlapping in the substantive crimes that they prohibit, constitute different offenses).
While Cronic was a case involving the bank fraud statute, "[t]he mail ... fraud [statute makes]
the same distinction as [the bank fraud statute] between schemes to defraud and schemes to obtain
property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises." United States v. Bonnett,
877 F.2d 1450, 1454 (I Oth Cir. 1989).
80. Cronic, 900 F.2d at 1513-14. Consequently, the tirst offense docs not require an
afftrmative misrepresentation, while the second is predicated on a misrepresentation. See id., see
also United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S 994 (1989)
(finding that mail fraud does not only implicate "schemes that involve false promises and
misrepresentations") (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 ( 1987)).
81. See United States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d 796, 801 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that while the
prosecution indicted on both prongs of the statute, and the jury was instructed similarly, the
prosecution did not have to prove a misrepresentation under both prongs).
82. United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989).
83. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1440 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that McNally
has essentially been nullified by § 1346, yet some of its influence remains).
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maintained the distinction between the two clauses. For example, the
model jury instruction for the Eighth Circuit provides:
The crime of mail fraud, as charged in (Count _ of) the indictment,
has four essential clements, which are:
One, the defendant voluntarily and intentionally (devised or made up a
scheme to defraud another out of (money, property or property rights)
(the intangible right to honest services)) (participated in a scheme to
defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent nature) (devised or participated in a scheme to obtain (money, property or property rights) (the
intangible right to honest services) by means offalse representations or
promises) (which scheme is described as follows: (describe scheme in
summary form or in manner charged in the indictment) );
Two, the defendant did so with the intent to defraud;
Three, it was reasonably foreseeable that the mails would be used; and
Four, the mails were used in furtherance of some essential step in the
scheme.x 4
This instruction clearly establishes the ability to prosecute under either,
or both, clauses of the mail fraud statute. While this seems to be the consensus among the jurisdictions, the Fifth Circuit's model jury instruction
differs slightly. It requires that:
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime (18 U.S.C.A. 1341 ),
you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant knowingly created a scheme to defraud, that is
_ _ _ (describe scheme from the indictment);
Second: That the defendant acted with a specific intent to commit fraud;
Third: That the defendant mailed something (caused another person to
mail something) for the purpose of carrying out the schcme.x5
This jury instruction does not specifically mention the misrepresentation
clause. However, this seems to merely be an oversight, as the Fifth Circuit has routinely held that the clauses are independent of one another. 86

84. MM/UAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TilE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUT, Instruction No. 6.18.1341 (1989) (emphasis added). The First, Seventh. Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits employ jury instructions mirroring that of the Eighth Circuit. See Devitt,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 40.03 (1990).
85. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT. Instruction No. 2.54 ( 1990).
86. For instance, in Pereira v. United States, the Supreme Colll1 lists the dements of mail
fraud as "(I) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc. for the purpose of executing
the scheme." 347 U.S. I, 8 (1954). From the language of McNally and other cases, obviously the
courts are aware of the second prong; courts merely will include the language of the second prong
as a different clement as the particular case demands. See generally United States v. Moser, 123
F. 3d 813 (5th Cir.) (focusing on some scheme), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 642 ( 1997); United States
v. Coyle, 943 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir.
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In part, this instruction represents a lazy shorthand that the courts often
engage in, providing the "scheme to defraud" language and assuming that
it includes the application of the scheme to "obtain money or property" as
appropriate. 87
Recognizing that the two clauses of the statute are independent, however, raises the question of whether they constitute separate offenses, and
implicitly, whether an individual could be charged with both as separate
crimes. Can an individual concurrently propagate fraud through both a
scheme to defraud and a scheme to obtain property or money through
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises? While some courts
have held that they may be presented as separate offenses, 88 not all courts
agree.
In United States v. Goldburg, 89 the defendant was charged with committing mail fraud, and the indictment included two separate counts, one
under each clause of the statute. While not directly argued by the defendant, the court discussed whether such a prosecution would be impermissible under the doctrine of duplicity. 90 The court felt that some dispute
has existed concerning whether the two clauses represent different offenses. The court noted that while the Tenth Circuit in Cronic held that
they were separate offenses, other courts have adopted "the considerably
less controversial proposition" that both types of fraud are prohibited, but
are not necessarily different offenses. 91 Using the implicit theory presented in McNally that the two clauses are "components of the same
crime," the court did not wish to hastily "align itself with a theory that
would allow most counts of mail fraud ... to be charged twice." 92 However, the court let the conviction stand, ruling that it was no violation of
the duplicity doctrine "for the jury to be presented with the two provisions as altematives." 93

1991) (quoting the language of the statute and then condensing it into language similar to Pereira)
Accord United States v. Quadro Corp., 928 F.Supp 688, 695 (1996), aff'd, 127 F.3d 34 (5th Cir.
1997) (focusing on a "material representation" rather than the "scheme Io defraud"). Compare
United Stales v. Miller, 997 F.2d I 010 (2d Cir. 1993) (confusing the analysis and seemingly
treating the two prongs as one).
87. This may also be viewed as an attempt by courts to judicially form the statute into a
more traditional construction, as courts often do in recognizing the substantive and jurisdictional
elements of an offense. This analysis is problematic with mail fraud because the first prong. the
"scheme." is fulfilled by planning, not conduct. Also, the second element is much broader than a
mere jurisdictional qualification. See Rakoff, supra note I, at 774-76.
88. See generally United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1514 (I Oth Cir. 1990).
89. 913 F. Supp 629 (D. Mass. 1996).
90. "The vice of a duplicitous indictment is that it fails to notify the defendant of the
charges. . . An indictment is duplicitous only if two offenses are alleged in the same count." !d.
at 635-36.
91. Id at 637 (quoting United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517, 1522 (lOth Cir. 1994)).
92. ld at 638.
93. /d.
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THE FUTURE OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE: PRAGMATIC POLICIES

For the federal prosecutor, the capability to indict under alternate
clauses of the mail fraud statue is a powerful tool. As efforts to prosecute
mail fraud are stepped up, newer frauds will emerge as more devious
schemes are employed to cheat the public. Indeed, "[n]o crime is rooted
out once and for all." 94 If interpreted to bestow upon prosecutors the
power to aver separate offenses, the two clauses of the mail fraud statute
would constitute a forceful tool in their hands to combat new crimes as
they develop. The absence of either a scheme to defraud or a misrepresentation would then not be fatal to a prosecution. The jury, guided by the
evidence, would simply have broader discretion to decide that the alleged
criminal actions fall within those "evil[s] sought to be remedied." 95 As it
now stands, however, the ability to charge a separate offense under each
clause, while manifestly an awesome power, is still a relatively uncertain
one.
Congress, the courts, and prosecutors should validate the ability to
indict under alternative clauses and make it resoundingly clear that the
power is necessary to combat ever-evolving mail fraud crime. With that
power, federal prosecutors attempting to employ the mail fraud statute
will be forced to consciously discern the true nature of the offending
fraud (does the innate nature of the fraud more closely resemble a scheme
to defraud or instead a scheme to obtain property or money through
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises?) and adduce evidence
that would support such a prosecution. Admittedly, prosecutorial interests
at times might favor averring the statute in a general form, 96 and broad,
unspecific allegations may result in convictions. However, the unsettling
results of McNally will not be replicated so swiftly if strict adherence to
statutory purity is honored on both the part of the bar and the judiciary.
So long as the different clauses of the statute are presented as alternatives
rather than as conjunctive components, courts will be apt to uphold mail
fraud convictions. 97 Such a policy does not restrict the future of the mail
fraud statute as a means of deterring fraud that would otherwise be
unprosecutable. Rather it cements the mail fraud statute in bedrock, allowing future prosecutions to build upon the past without falling subject

94. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER ~ 35.13, at 68 (David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., New
England Publi,hing Associates 1986) (quoting TERTULLIAN, THE CHRISTIAN'S DEFENSE (c. 215)).
95. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
96. Indeed, most often courts will allow latitude as a measure of prosecutorial discretion.
See United States v. Bract, 747 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the court uses
a broad, not a technical standard determining the sufficiency of an indictment).
97. See generally United States v. Goldburg, 913 F. Supp 629 (D. Mass. 1996).
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to unsupported pitfalls such as occurred in McNally. Fraud will continue,
each time becoming more insidious and cunning, "for the children of this
world are in their generation wiser than the children of light." 98 Only
through a creative and malleable prosecutorial tool like the mail fraud
statute can such fraud be regulated.
Courts in the future must cling to a policy of consistency, maintaining
a sharp judicial distinction between the clauses. Defiance of the clear differences in the clauses will only further distort the legal process and create an illegitimate child of the judiciary, formed from the illicit union of
consanguineous statutory components. Courts must concisely dispel the
phantomlike specters of McNally-esque jurisprudence in order to effectively define the boundaries of the mail fraud statute. Only by maintaining the integrity of the disjunctive barrier between the clauses can the
courts venerate the intents of Congress while taming any unwarranted
expansion of the statute. Such reasoning is not a clarion call for unrestrained use of the mail fraud statute, but a summons for reason in determining its respective boundaries. Concomitantly, courts must further clarify the applicability of the statute, guiding the prosecutors in their quest
for justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent cases involving the misrepresentation branch of the mail
fraud statute, the courts have grappled with the applicability of McNally.
The Supreme Court never held that the two statutory clauses became indistinguishable: merely that their separation was not impermeable. In essence, the courts now attempt to honor the Durland decision while being
governed by McNally. The misrepresentation clause of the mail fraud
statute was intended as an amplification of the statute; it constitutes a departure from early mail fraud prosecutions. If courts were to hold that the
two clauses were to be treated as one, then the mail fraud statute would
become more narrow than at any time in its history. Truly, the nasty darling of the nursery would be reprimanded. However, this fate seems to
have been at least reprieved as the Supreme Court has not since McNally
attempted to rein in this critical prosecutorial power.
As John Stuart Mill said: "Laws and institutions require to be
adapted, not to good men, but to bad." 99 Fraud, by its nature, adapts and
changes. Fraud is chameleon-like, altering its appearance to the hopes
and expectations of a naive public. As criminals become more creative,

98. Luke 16:8 (King James).
99. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 289 n.64 (D. Minn. 1963) (quoting THE
SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN (1869)). See THE QUOTABLE LAWYER supra note 94, § 36.12. at 72
(quoting same).
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prosecutors need a pliable instrument to implement the law. The mail
fraud statute has provided that tool, allowing prosecutors to delve into the
fray armed with broad statutory mandates and expansive judicial directives. While the integrity of the misrepresentation clause has been questioned in the past, post-McNally case law has supported its continued application and autonomy. Happily, the scheme-to-defraud and misrepresentation clauses still remain largely independent. Only if courts continue
to honor and strengthen that deliniation will the mail fraud statute remain
the true love of federal prosecutors.
Christopher Q. Cutler

